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Note 
The Case Against Self-Representation in Capital 
Proceedings 
Max S. Meckstroth* 
On November 5, 2009, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, an army 
psychologist facing an impending deployment to Afghanistan, 
entered Fort Hood’s Soldier Readiness Processing Center in 
Killeen, Texas.
1
 Equipped with a laser-sighted semi-automatic 
handgun, Hasan opened fire upon the military personnel there-
in.
2
 In only ten minutes, thirteen soldiers were killed and thir-
ty-two more were wounded
3
—the deadliest shooting to ever 
take place on a United States military base.
4
 Once in custody, 
Hasan was charged with thirteen counts of premeditated mur-
der, and thirty-two counts of attempted murder.
5
 Nearly four 
years after the horrific shooting, Hasan’s court-martial com-
menced on August 6, 2013.
6
 Having exercised his right of self-
representation,
7
 Hasan began by offering a self-incriminating 
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insight and guidance during the writing process. Special thanks to the editors 
and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their contributions to this Note. 
Thank you to my friends and family for their support during my law school 
years despite my occasional hermit tendencies. Above all, thank you to my 
parents, Kurt and Jodeen Meckstroth, for encouraging and inspiring me 
throughout my life. Copyright © 2015 by Max S. Meckstroth. 
 1. See James C. McKinley Jr. & James Dao, Fort Hood Gunman Gave 
Signals Before His Rampage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2009/11/09/us/09reconstruct.html. 
 2. See Ellen Wulfhorst & Jane J. Pruet, Fort Hood Shooter Sentenced to 
Death for 2009 Killings, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2013, 7:06 PM), http://www 
.reuters.com/article/2013/08/28/us-usa-crime-forthood 
-idUSBRE97Q11A20130828.  
 3. Clifford Krauss, Defendant in Court for Hearing at Ft. Food, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/us/13hearing.html. 
 4. Cf. id. (describing the events as the “bloodiest shooting on a United 
States military base in modern times”).  
 5. Id. 
 6. See Josh Rubin & Matt Smith, ‘I Am the Shooter,’ Nidal Hasan Tells 
Fort Hood Court-Martial, CNN (Aug. 6, 2013, 6:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2013/08/06/justice/hasan-court-martial/index.html. 
 7. See Angela K. Brown, Nidal Hasan, Fort Hood Suspect, Granted Right 
To Represent Himself at Trial, HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2013, 5:12 AM), 
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opening statement, informing the jury that the “evidence will 
clearly show that I am the shooter.”
8
 Hasan’s controversial de-
fense strategy
9
—or lack thereof
10
—resulted in the jury finding 
him guilty on all charges.
11
 During the sentencing phase, Hasan 
did not offer mitigating evidence, and idly watched as the pros-
ecution called victims and relatives of his victims to testify 
against him.
12
 On August, 28, 2013, after merely two hours of 
deliberation, the jury sentenced Hasan to death.
13
 
Hasan’s court-martial ignited social commentary discuss-
ing a defendant’s right of self-representation.
14
 And while it 
may be hard to argue against the outcome of Hasan’s case, the 
manner in which he represented himself belittled the nature of 
the capital proceeding, illustrating the need to rethink the right 
of self-representation. When the Supreme Court in Faretta v. 
California inferred this right from the text of the Sixth 
Amendment,
15
 it was largely out of respect for the defendant’s 
personal autonomy.
16
 However, by overvaluing a defendant’s 
autonomy, the Court undervalued not only a defendant’s inter-
 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/03/nidal-hasan-represent-himself_ 
n_3379274.html.  
 8. See Rubin & Smith, supra note 6.  
 9. Indeed, even Hasan’s court-appointed standby counsel attempted to 
limit their roles because of their moral and ethical objections to, what they be-
lieved to be, Hasan’s attempt to throw his own case and ensure the death pen-
alty. See Manny Fernandez, Calling No Witnesses, Defendant in Fort Hood 
Shooting Rests His Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/fort-hood-shooting-suspect-rests-his-case.html. 
 10. See id. (discussing Hasan’s decision not to cross-examine hundreds of 
witnesses and pieces of evidences set forth by the prosecution). 
 11. See Manny Fernandez, Judge Denies Lawyers’ Request in Fort Hood 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/us/ 
judge-denies-defense-lawyers-request-in-fort-hood-case.html.  
 12. Bill Mears, Fort Hood Shooting Jury Recommends Death Penalty for 
Nidal Hasan, CNN (Aug. 29, 2013, 7:02 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/28/ 
us/nidal-hasan-sentencing/index.html.   
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Fort Hood Suspect’s Fool of a Lawyer: Col-
umn, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/opinion/2013/08/08/malik-hasan-fort-hood-suspect-column/2629709; Mi-
cah Schwartzbach, Fort Hood and the Right To Self-Representation, 
UNCUFFED (Aug. 29, 2013, 12:22 PM), http://uncuffedcrime.blogspot.com/ 
2013/08/the-fort-hood-attack-and-right-to-self.html (evaluating the policy con-
siderations of self-representation following Hasan’s court-martial).   
 15. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (“Although not stated 
in the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation . . . is 
thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment.”).  
 16. See id. at 833–34 (considering the history of the Sixth Amendment, 
and opining that “there can be no doubt that [the founding fathers] understood 
the inestimable worth of free choice”). 
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est, but society’s interest in a fair and efficient trial.
17
 The legit-
imacy of the adversarial system and the integrity of judicial 
process each require that the rights of even the most heinous 
defendants be treated with absolute care.
18
 
This Note argues that the right of self-representation (pro 
se representation), raises serious concerns when exercised in 
capital proceedings. By enabling a defendant to proceed pro se 
in a capital proceeding, the Court not only compromises the 
safeguards it sought to observe when a defendant’s life is at 
stake,
19
 but it jeopardizes the integrity of a trial’s adversarial 
process. Part I discusses the origins and scope of the right of 
self-representation and concludes with a brief overview of the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of the death penalty. Part II cri-
tiques the constitutional underpinnings of self-representation, 
examines the right’s unique concerns during capital proceed-
ings, and evaluates scholarly attempts to quell those concerns. 
Part III argues that judicial opinions and scholarly attempts to 
mitigate the legal and ethical implications of self-
representation, while professing to retain a defendant’s auton-
omy, are inherently contradictory. Ultimately, this Note con-
cludes that the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation 
should be qualified by eliminating its availability to any de-
fendant facing the death penalty.   
I.  THE ORIGINS OF SELF-REPRESENTATION, ITS SCOPE, 
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY   
Part I provides the background necessary to understand 
the tensions implicated when courts allow a defendant to pro-
ceed pro se in a capital proceeding. Section A discusses the ori-
gins of the right of self-representation, and the right’s qualifica-
tions since its fortification in Faretta. Section B offers a brief 
overview of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the death penal-
ty. 
 
 17. See Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 
CHAP. L. REV. 57, 61 (1998) (“Our purpose as a society is not only to respect 
the humanity of the guilty defendant and to protect the innocent from the pos-
sibility of an unjust conviction . . . we also seek through the adversary system 
to preserve the integrity of society itself . . . [by] keeping sound and wholesome 
the procedure by which society visits its condemnation on an erring member.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 18. Cf. id. (“There is . . . an important systemic purpose served by assur-
ing that even guilty people have rights.”). 
 19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). 
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A. THE ROAD TO RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT OF SELF-
REPRESENTATION 
The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees that a crimi-
nal defendant be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel 
when making his defense.
20
 Recognizing that the “average de-
fendant does not have the legal skill to protect himself when 
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liber-
ty,”
21
 the right to assistance of counsel is considered indispen-
sable to the “fair administration of our adversarial system of 
criminal justice.”
22
 The Supreme Court extends the right to all 
“critical stages” in the criminal justice process,
23
 and most im-
portantly for the purposes of this Note, a defendant’s trial.
24
 
Nevertheless, the right of self-representation has long been 
recognized by federal courts through the Judiciary Act of 1789
25
 
and the right is currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654, provid-
ing that parties may appear in federal court “personally or by 
counsel.”
26
 However, because the Judiciary Act applied only to 
federal courts, it left states to regulate the right of self-
representation on an individual basis.
27
  
This Section offers a historical overview of the right of self-
representation. Subsection 1 begins by reviewing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Faretta, and articulates the Court’s justifi-
cations for constitutionalizing the right of self-representation. 
Subsection 2 describes the requirements necessary to assert an 
effective waiver of counsel—effectively invoking the right of 
 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 21. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938). 
 22. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985); see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (holding that “the right to counsel plays 
a crucial role in the adversarial system.”). 
 23. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) (“A defendant 
who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel appointed to repre-
sent the defendant at every state of the [criminal] proceeding from initial ap-
pearance through appeal, unless the defendant waives this right.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
 25. The right of self-representation was first codified in § 35 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, granting parties the right to “plead and manage their own 
causes personally or by the assistance of . . . counsel.” Judiciary Act of 1789, 
ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92, § 35 (1789). 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012) (“In all courts of the United States the parties 
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the 
rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes 
therein.”). 
 27. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813, 814 n.10 (1975) (recogniz-
ing that thirty-six out of fifty states provided the right of self-representation 
expressly in their respective constitutions).  
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self-representation. Subsection 3 concludes by discussing the 
scope of self-representation.  
1. Faretta v. California 
In Faretta v. California, Anthony Faretta was charged with 
grand theft.
28
 Before his trial, Faretta requested to represent 
himself because he believed the public defender’s office already 
suffered from a “heavy case load.”
29
 After entering a prelimi-
nary ruling accepting Faretta’s waiver of the assistance of 
counsel,
30
 the judge reconsidered Faretta’s ability to conduct his 
own defense by questioning him about the hearsay rule and 
state laws governing challenges to potential jurors.
31
 After con-
sidering Faretta’s responses, the judge determined that Faretta 
had not only failed to make an “intelligent and knowing waiver 
of his right to the assistance of counsel,”
32
 but he also held that 
Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own de-
fense.
33
 Accordingly, the trial court required Faretta to present 
his defense through appointed counsel, and he was ultimately 
found guilty and sentenced to prison.
34
 The California Court of 
Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, and the California 
Supreme Court denied review without opinion.
35
 Subsequently, 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address 
the constitutionality of preventing Faretta from representing 
himself, and requiring appointed counsel to conduct his repre-
sentation.
36
  
Drawing upon a “consensus” of its prior precedent and 
state constitutions,
37
 the Court—in a sharply divided opin-
ion
38
—concluded that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the 
right of self-representation in all criminal prosecutions.
39
 The 
Court reached this conclusion after considering three inter-
 
 28. Id. at 807. 
 29. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30. Id. at 808.  
 31. See id. at 808–09. 
 32. Id. at 809–10; see also id. at 835 (“[I]n order to represent himself, the 
accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” 
(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938))). 
 33. Id. at 810.  
 34. Id. at 811. 
 35. Id. at 812.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 817. 
 38. See People v. Dent, 30 Cal. 4th 213, 223 (2003) (Chin, J., concurring) 
(describing Faretta as being decided “over strong dissents”). Additionally, see 
the discussion infra Part II.A analyzing the dissenting opinions. 
 39. Faretta. 422 U.S. at 821.  
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related ideas: (1) the structure of the Sixth Amendment; (2) 
historical evidence identifying the right of self-representation 
since the country’s founding; and (3) respect for the defendant’s 
autonomy.
40
 
The Court focused its textual construction of the Sixth 
Amendment by examining its pertinent parts: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
41
  
From this “compact statement of the rights necessary to a 
full defense”
42
 the Court determined that the Sixth Amendment 
does more than guarantee that a defense will be made for the 
accused—it empowers the defendant to make his defense per-
sonally.
43
 Reasoning that it is the defendant who must be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him, 
and the defendant who must be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, the Amendment grants the right to defend directly 
to the accused, “for it is he who suffers the consequences if the 
defense fails.”
44
 Further, because counsel only serves as an “as-
sistant,” thrusting counsel upon an unwilling defendant com-
promises the defendant’s ability to present his defense as he 
sees fit.
45
 
The Court buttressed its conclusion that the Sixth 
Amendment implies the right of self-representation through 
the right’s origins in English and colonial legal history.
46
 Exam-
ining English criminal jurisprudence, the Court noted that “it 
was not representation by counsel but self-representation that 
was the practice in prosecutions for serious crime.”
47
 In fact, 
throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, felonious defendants 
were not permitted to be represented by counsel, and it was not 
 
 40. See Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 
U.S. 152, 156 (2000). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818. 
 42. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818. 
 43. Id. at 819. 
 44. Id. at 820. 
 45. See id. at 821 (“Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representa-
tion, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitu-
tion, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.”).  
 46. See id. at 821–32 (discussing English and colonial jurisprudence). 
 47. Id. at 823. But see id. at 821–23 (discussing the Star Chamber—the 
only tribunal in Great Britain that required defendants be represented by 
counsel—which was “swept away” by revolution in 1641).  
2015] SELF-REPRESENTATION 1941 
 
until 1836 when England formally lifted the ban on counsel in 
felony cases.
48
 
The Court also considered colonial legal history, noting 
that the “insistence upon a right of self-representation was . . . 
more fervent than in England,” a result of the colonists’ “vir-
tues of self-reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers.”
49
 
Nonetheless, unlike their English counterparts, colonial judges 
were more willing to permit felons the aid of counsel; however, 
the right to counsel continued to be seen as only supplementing 
the accused’s primary right to defend himself.
50
 Further, be-
cause § 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which granted parties 
the right to “plead and manage their own causes personally or 
by the assistance of . . . counsel,” was signed one day before the 
Sixth Amendment was proposed, the Court believed that “[i]f 
anyone had thought that the Sixth Amendment, as drafted, 
failed to protect the . . . right of self-representation, there would 
undoubtedly have been some debate or comment on the issue.”
51
 
Finally, having performed a textual analysis of the Sixth 
Amendment, as well as a historical inquiry, the Court rested its 
decision upon the value of individual autonomy.
52
  Although the 
Court conceded that most defendants are better off with the as-
 
 48. Id. at 825 n.27 (“[T]he accused ‘shall be admitted, after the Close of 
the Case for the Prosecution, to make full Answer and Defence thereto by 
Counsel learned in the Law, or by Attorney in Courts where Attornies practise 
as Counsel.’” (quoting 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, s 1)).  
 49. Id. at 826 (describing the colonists’ contempt for lawyers as resulting 
from prior experiences with lawyers “bent on the conviction of those who op-
posed the King’s prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure convictions.”); see 
also Jeffrey P. Willhite, Rethinking the Standards for Waiver of Counsel and 
Proceeding Pro Se in Iowa, 78 IOWA L. REV. 205, 208–09 (1992) (arguing that 
the colonists’ “distrust for attorneys was more intense than their English 
counterparts because of the persecution they suffered for their opposition to 
the Crown”). For a detailed analysis of the colonial attitudes and practices 
that laid the foundations for the Faretta decision, see generally Aileen R. 
Leventon, Recent Development, Constitutional Law—Criminal Procedure—
Independent Right of Self-Representation in Sixth Amendment Permits De-
fendant To Act As Own Lawyer at State Criminal Trials, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 
1019, 1022–31 (1976). 
 50. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 829–30. 
 51. See id. at 831–32. But see id. at 844 (Burger, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the fact that the Sixth Amendment was proposed merely one day after  
§ 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was signed weakens the majority’s belief, ra-
ther than reinforces it, because “under traditional canons of construction” the 
framers’ omission—given the close temporal proximity—indicates that it was 
done so intentionally).    
 52. The majority opinion’s final paragraph reads, “In forcing Faretta . . . 
to accept against his will a state-appointed public defender, the California 
courts deprived him of his constitutional right to conduct his own defense.” Id. 
at 836 (emphasis added). 
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sistance of counsel, the Court found this an insufficient reason 
to force counsel upon an unwilling defendant.
53
 Because it is the 
“defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, [who] will bear the 
personal consequences of a conviction” a defendant must be 
empowered to decide whether he thinks it is advantageous to 
proceed with counsel
54
—even if it is to the defendant’s detri-
ment.
55
 
Therefore, because the Court found that the structure of 
the Sixth Amendment implied the right of self-representation,
56
 
and that the right had been recognized throughout English and 
colonial jurisprudence,
57
 as well as the fact that the framers of 
the Bill of Rights placed an emphasis on the importance of in-
dividual autonomy,
58
 the Court emboldened Faretta’s right of 
self-representation. This is evidenced by the Court’s holding 
that Faretta’s right was violated when the trial court required 
that counsel present his defense against his will. 
2. Effectively Waiving Counsel 
While Faretta was the first case authoritatively holding 
that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of self-
representation in criminal prosecutions at the state and federal 
level,
59
 the requirements to effectively waive counsel were al-
ready developing. Specifically, because a pro se defendant sur-
renders the benefits of counsel, a defendant’s waiver of his 
right to counsel must be “knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”
60
 
The Court considers an intelligent waiver as one reflecting that 
the defendant “knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open.”
61
 However, when determining whether a de-
fendant’s waiver is made with “eyes open” the Court acknowl-
edges that the defendant must be “warned specifically of the 
 
 53. Id. at 834 (opining that compelled representation bestows counsel’s 
benefits “imperfectly” and that it would “lead [a defendant] to believe that the 
law contrives against him.”). 
 54. The Court acknowledges that in “rare instances” a defendant may 
present his defense more effectively. See id. 
 55. See id.  
 56. Id. at 821. 
 57. See id. at 832. 
 58. See id. at 833–34 (“[T]here can be no doubt that [those who wrote the 
Bill of Rights] understood the inestimable worth of free choice.”). 
 59. See Eugene Cerruti, Self-Representation in the International Arena: 
Removing a False Right of Spectacle, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 919, 924 (2009). 
 60. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
 61. Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 
(1942) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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hazards”
62
 and “disadvantages of self-representation” when pro-
ceeding to trial without counsel.
63
 Determining whether the 
aforementioned requirements are satisfied involves a factual 
inquiry considering the “particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case.”
64
  
3. The Scope of the Right of Self-Representation 
Having reviewed the origins of the right of self-
representation, as well as the requirements of an effective 
waiver of counsel, it is important to understand the scope of the 
right. The right of self-representation is not absolute, and the 
Supreme Court has steadily narrowed and refined the reach of 
the right.
65
 First, the Faretta Court made it clear that it does 
not consider a defendant’s right of self-representation as equiv-
alent to a “license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom,” and 
held that “the trial judge may terminate self-representation by 
a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstruc-
tionist misconduct.”
66
  
Second, the Supreme Court has circumscribed the right of 
self-representation in the context of mental competency. Be-
cause mental illnesses are prone to variation in time and in de-
gree,
67
 the Court distinguishes between the mental competency 
required to stand trial versus the competency required to pro-
ceed pro se.
68
 Thus, in Indiana v. Edwards, the Court held that 
“the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation 
by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial . . . but 
who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where 
 
 62. Id. at 89.  
 63. Id. (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988)) (holding 
that the warnings must be “rigorously conveyed”). 
 64. Id. at 92.  
 65. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (stating that Faretta 
“and later cases have made clear that the right of self-representation is not 
absolute”). 
 66. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975); see, e.g., United 
States v. Espinoza, 374 F. App’x 536, 539 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that the de-
fendant’s refusal to answer the court’s questions seeking to confirm the de-
fendant’s desire to proceed pro se provided “ample cause for concern that [the 
defendant] would be obstructionist” and held that his right to proceed pro se 
was properly denied). 
 67. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175. 
 68. The Edwards Court found that prior cases dealing with a defendant’s 
mental competency had “assume[ed] representation by counsel and empha-
size[d] the importance of counsel.” See id. at 174. In light of this, the Court de-
termines that a defendant’s choice to “forgo counsel at trial presents a very 
different set of circumstances . . . [calling] . . . for a different standard.” Id. at 
174–75. 
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they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by them-
selves.”
69
 The Court reached this determination because it be-
lieved that “a right of self-representation at trial will not affirm 
the dignity of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to 
conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.”
70
 
Third, in Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth 
Appellate District, the Supreme Court held that a defendant 
has no constitutional right of self-representation on a direct 
appeal in a criminal case and counsel can be required to con-
duct the defendant’s appeal at the court’s discretion.
71
 Because 
the defendant is the one that ordinarily initiates the appellate 
process, and because the defendant no longer demands the pre-
sumption of innocence, “the States are clearly within their dis-
cretion to conclude that the government’s interests [in the fair 
and efficient administration of justice] outweigh an invasion of 
the appellant’s interest in self-representation.”
72
 
Fourth, the Court has held that when a defendant elects to 
represent himself, a judge may appoint standby counsel—even 
over the defendant’s objection—to relieve the judge’s need to 
“explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to as-
sist the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in 
the way of the defendant’s achievement of his own clearly indi-
cated goals.”
73
 Although the precise role of standby counsel re-
mains undefined,
74
 the Court has made clear that so long as the 
defendant’s general control over his defense remains intact, the 
presence of standby counsel will not violate a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.
75
 In fact, it is permissible for standby coun-
 
 69. Id. at 178.   
 70. See id. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 
U.S. 152, 160 (2000). 
 72. See id. at 162–63. 
 73. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183–84 (1984) (holding that “[a] 
defendant does not have a constitutional right to receive personal instruction 
from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. Nor does the Constitution require 
judges to take over chores for a pro se defendant that would normally be at-
tended to by trained counsel . . . .”).  
 74. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Ethical Guidance for Standby Counsel in 
Criminal Cases: A Far Cry From Counsel?, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 211, 212 
(2013) (describing standby counsel expectations as undefined, while noting 
varying jurisdictional interpretations). 
 75. See Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 183–84 (finding that a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights are not infringed when standby counsel “assists . . . in 
overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles” nor when “counsel . . . 
helps to ensure the defendant’s compliance with basic rules of courtroom pro-
tocol and procedure” because, in the aforementioned instances, there is no 
“significant interference with the defendant’s actual control over the presenta-
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sel “to steer a defendant through the basic procedures of trial” 
even if it “undermines the pro se defendant’s appearance of con-
trol over his own defense.”
76
   
B. THROWING THE SWITCH ON THE DEATH PENALTY, THEN 
FLIPPING IT BACK ON 
The death penalty—capital punishment—is a polarizing is-
sue with a long history of constitutional and moral debate.
77
 
Nevertheless, this Note neither advocates for nor against the 
death penalty. Instead, it presumes the validity of the Supreme 
Court’s justifications for the death penalty’s constitutionality 
under Gregg v. Georgia, and considers the relevant implications 
of those justifications when a defendant chooses to exercise his 
or her right of self-representation in a capital proceeding. This 
Section provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the death penalty.
78
 Subsection 1 discusses the 
Court’s holding in Furman v. Georgia, which rendered capital 
punishment unconstitutional as it was then applied. Subsection 
2 examines the Court’s later holding in Gregg v. Georgia and 
considers its rationale for reinstating the death penalty.   
1. Power Out: Furman v. Georgia 
In Furman v. Georgia,
79
 the Supreme Court, for the first 
time, ruled directly on the constitutionality of capital punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause.
80
 The case, a consolidation of three separate 
 
tion of his defense”); John H. Pearson, Comment, Mandatory Advisory Counsel 
for Pro Se Defendants: Maintaining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CALIF. 
L. REV. 697, 712 (1984) (explaining that what this imposition sacrifices with 
regard to the defendant’s autonomy, it makes up by furthering “society’s inter-
est in fairness”). 
 76. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 184. 
 77. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Mandatory Life and the Death of Equitable Dis-
cretion, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 42–49 
(Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) (arguing against the max-
im that “death is different” when juxtaposed with a sentence of life without 
parole). 
 78. Brief indeed. The death penalty, in and of itself, is so controversial 
that it has been the topic of countless pieces of literature. See, e.g., DEBATING 
THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? THE 
EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR BEST CASE (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul 
G. Cassell eds., 2004); Bowers, supra note 77. For the purpose of this Note, 
however, I will consider the Supreme Court’s treatment of two pivotal cases 
and extrapolate the reasoning from those cases into the context of self-
representation. 
 79. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 80. Id. at 239–40; see U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII; see also The Death Pen-
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cases, involved petitioner Furman, who had been convicted of 
murder, petitioner Jackson, who had been convicted of rape, 
and petitioner Branch, who had also been convicted of rape.
81
 
All three men were black males, and all three were sentenced 
to death.
82
 In a 5–4 decision consisting of nine separate opin-
ions, the majority found that Georgia’s imposition of the death 
penalty unconstitutionally violated the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause of the Eight Amendment.
83
 Justices Douglas, 
Stewart, and White relied largely upon the fact that the death 
sentences at issue were not being mandatorily imposed by the 
respective state legislatures and, instead, were being imposed 
at the discretion of the jury.
84
 
Justice Douglas’ concurrence embodies the Court’s concern 
over the discretionary nature of the death penalty, observing 
that “the discretion of judges and juries . . . enables the penalty 
to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused 
if he is poor and despised, . . . lacking political clout, or if he is a 
member of a[n] . . . unpopular minority. . . .”
85
 Further, Justice 
Douglas interpreted the cruel and unusual punishment clause 
of the Eighth Amendment to “require legislatures to write pe-
nal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary” 
and judges to ensure the laws are not applied “sparsely, selec-
tively, and spottily to unpopular groups.”
86
 Therefore, because 
“no standards govern[ed] the [jurors’] selection of the [death] 
penalty,”
87
 the Court held that the state statutes operated un-
constitutionally.
88
 
Justice Stewart’s concurrence added to the concerns articu-
lated by Justice Douglas. Stewart believed that “[t]he penalty 
of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, 
not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocabil-
 
alty, 86 HARV. L. REV. 76, 76 (1972). 
 81. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 252–53 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 82. Id.  
 83. MICHAEL A. FOLEY, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS: THE SUPREME 
COURT, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 62 (2003). 
 84. The Death Penalty, supra note 80, at 77. Justices Marshall and Bren-
nan—rounding out the majority—“relied less heavily . . . on the discretionary 
nature of the death sentences” and could be construed as advocating for the 
death penalty to be per se unconstitutional. Id. at 79. 
 85. Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. at 256. 
 87. Id. at 253. 
 88. Id. at 256–57 (finding the laws “pregnant with discrimination  
[, which] is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of 
the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment”). 
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ity.”
89
 However, Justice Stewart,
90
 like Justices Douglas
91
 and 
White,
92
 refrained from determining whether a mandatory 
death penalty for a particular crime would sufficiently elimi-
nate the discretionary nature of the death penalty, thus render-
ing such a statute constitutional.  
2. Power On: Gregg v. Georgia 
Because three of the five Justices comprising Furman’s 
majority opinion held that the death penalty was unconstitu-
tional because its administration was “haphazard, arbitrary, 
and [a] capricious infliction of . . . punishment inconsistent with 
general constitutional protections that guarantee people the 
ideal of equal dignity under the law,”
93
 the case did not categor-
ically hold that the death penalty was unconstitutional. Never-
theless, the fallout from Furman resulted in a moratorium on 
the death penalty.
94
 While some states decided to formally abol-
ish the death penalty from their state constitutions,
95
 other 
state legislatures went back to the drawing board and began 
crafting new death penalty statutes with Furman in mind.
96
  
 
 89. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). The sentiment that the death 
penalty is fundamentally different has been a recurring theme in death penal-
ty opinions. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) 
(“[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprison-
ment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment 
than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of 
that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a 
specific case.”). 
 90. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that 
“[t]he constitutionality of capital punishment in the abstract is not, however, 
before [the court] in these cases”). 
 91. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Whether a mandatory death 
penalty would otherwise be constitutional is a question I do not reach.”). 
 92. See id. at 310–11 (White, J., concurring) (opining that “[t]he facial 
constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of the death penalty for 
first-degree murder, for more narrowly defined categories of murder, or for 
rape would present quite different issues . . . than are posed by the cases be-
fore [the court]” (emphasis added)). 
 93. FOLEY, supra note 83, at 89. 
 94. Introduction to the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty (last visited Apr. 
3, 2015) (discussing the suspension of the death penalty after Furman and the 
reinstatement of the death penalty four years later in Gregg). 
 95. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (noting that North Dakota abolished the death pen-
alty in 1973).  
 96. Introduction to the Death Penalty, supra note 94 (noting that 35 states 
drafted and enacted new death penalty statutes following Furman). 
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In Gregg v. Georgia,
97
 the state of Georgia was back in front 
of the Supreme Court, but this time it was equipped with a new 
death penalty statute incorporating Furman.
98
 The 7–2 majori-
ty began its analysis by examining the statutory scheme im-
plemented to impose the death penalty. Primarily, the Court 
considered the effect of Georgia’s decision to bifurcate the trial 
into two distinct parts: (1) determining the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence—either by judge or jury; and (2) after a verdict, find-
ing, or guilty plea is entered, consisting of the sentencing phase 
of the trial.
99
 During the sentencing phase, after hearing addi-
tional aggravating or mitigating evidence, a judge or jury had 
to find that at least one out of a possible ten aggravating cir-
cumstances was present, and would then elect to impose the 
corresponding sentence.
100
 “If the verdict [was] death, the jury 
or judge must specify the aggravating circumstance(s) found. In 
jury cases, the trial judge [would be] bound by the jury’s rec-
ommended sentence.”
101
  
Significantly, Furman held that when making a determi-
nation as irrevocable as life or death, “discretion must be suita-
bly directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of . . . arbi-
trary and capricious action”
102
 for “[w]hen a defendant’s life is at 
stake, the Court has been particularly sensitive to insure that 
every safeguard is observed.”
103
 In light of Georgia’s bifurcated 
trial for capital cases, as well as the comprehensive list of fac-
tors on which a judge or jury must base their decision, the 
Court determined that the statute successfully alleviated the 
arbitrary and capricious concerns that plagued Georgia’s previ-
ous statute.
104
 
Having examined the origins of the right of self-
representation, as well as a broad overview of the two seminal 
cases encapsulating death penalty jurisprudence, Part II dis-
cusses the corresponding tensions between the doctrine of self-
representation and death penalty jurisprudence.  
 
 97. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 98. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2503–27-2537 (1975); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
162–68 (walking through the Georgia death penalty statute step-by-step).  
 99. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162–64. 
 100. See id. at 164–66 (citation omitted). 
 101. Id. at 166. 
 102. Id. at 189. 
 103. Id. at 187 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)) (emphasis 
added). 
 104. See id. at 206–07 (finding that the jury’s discretion had been suffi-
ciently channeled). 
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II.  CONSTITUTIONAL CROSSROADS: ANALYZING THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-
REPRESENTATION IN A CAPITAL PROCEEDING   
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the right 
of self-representation at trial during a capital proceeding.
105
 
Nevertheless, as courts and commentators continue to grapple 
with the parameters of self-representation, the Supreme Court 
appears willing to reconsider the right of self-representation if 
a worthy case were to present itself.
106
 This Note suggests that 
such a case can be found when a defendant proceeds pro se in a 
capital proceeding. This Part addresses the implications of the 
right of self-representation in light of the Court’s treatment of 
the death penalty. Section A begins by discussing Faretta’s con-
stitutional underpinnings and examines why that foundation is 
unstable. Section B builds upon Section A by analyzing the ten-
sions between the right of self-representation and the safe-
guards required in a capital proceeding. Section C critiques two 
commonly asserted solutions to address the negative implica-
tions stemming from the right of self-representation. 
A. REVISITING THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF 
FARETTA 
Recall that the majority opinion in Faretta relied upon 
three pillars when reaching its decision.
107
 First, the majority 
conducted a textual interpretation of the Sixth Amendment to 
infer the right of self-representation.
108
 Second, it conducted a 
historical inquiry into English and colonial legal history.
109
 
Third, it emphasized the importance of a defendant’s free 
choice in criminal prosecutions.
110
 Ultimately, the majority so-
 
 105. See Eric Rieder, Note, The Right of Self-Representation in the Capital 
Case, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 130, 134 (1985). The Supreme Court tangentially 
heard a case dealing with the right of self-representation in a capital case, see 
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), but that case dealt with a defendant 
who wished to discharge court appointed counsel and enter a guilty plea. Id. at 
392. Thus, Godinez only stands for the proposition that the competency re-
quired to plead guilty is the same competency required to stand trial. Id. at 
399.  
 106. Cf. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 
U.S. 152, 164–65 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court 
may be willing to reconsider the constitutional assumptions underlying 
Faretta upon a showing that the holding has proved “counterproductive in 
practice”). 
 107. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
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lidified the defendant’s right to waive assistance of counsel, 
thereby respecting their decision to proceed pro se.
111
 However, 
three justices vehemently disagreed with the majority’s charac-
terization of the “right” of self-representation
112
 and contested 
the majority’s rationale. 
Both dissenting opinions take issue with the majority’s re-
liance on the fact that because the Judiciary Act of 1789—
which expressly provided for the right of self-representation—
was passed the day before the Sixth Amendment was pro-
posed,
113
 it lends credence to the interpretation that the Sixth 
Amendment implied a right of self-representation.
114
 Converse-
ly, both opinions appropriately point out that the timing of the 
two enactments could just as persuasively, if not more so, be 
used to suggest that the framers purposely left out a right of 
self-representation.
115
 Chief Justice Burger argues that, “under 
traditional canons of construction, inclusion of the right in the 
Judiciary Act and its omission from the [Sixth Amendment] 
drafted at the same time by many of the same men, supports 
the conclusion that the omission was intentional.”
116
 
The dissent also takes issue with the majority’s reliance on 
historical analysis, arguing that the majority exaggerates when 
it analogizes the practice of imposing counsel upon a defendant 
with the “notorious procedures of the Star Chamber” in Great 
Britain.
117
 This notion is supported by the recent scholarship of 
 
 111. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 112. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836–46 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting); id. at 846–52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 113. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, § 35 (“[P]arties may plead and 
manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel or 
attorneys at law . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 114. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 844–45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 846–
49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 115. See id. at 844–45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (opining that the “contem-
poraneous action of Congress” passing the right of self-representation in the 
Judiciary Act, should “lead judges to conclude that the Constitution leaves to 
the judgment of legislatures, and the flexible process of statutory amendment” 
to determine whether criminal defendants should be permitted to proceed pro 
se at trial); id. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (taking the view that because 
the Sixth Amendment remained “conspicuously silent on any right of self-
representation” despite the passing of the Judiciary Act the day before, “the 
Framers simply did not have the subject in mind when they drafted” the Sixth 
Amendment).  
 116. Id. at 844 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Star Chamber was a tribu-
nal used in Great Britain for nearly 200 years. Cerruti, supra note 59, at 929–
30. It required “every defendant to be represented by counsel who was willing 
to vouch for the defendant’s intended defense.” Id. at 930. However, the Star 
Chamber became tainted with corruption, and defendants felt increasingly un-
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Professor Eugene Cerruti, who argues that the majority opinion 
in Faretta “misstated” the real significance of the Star Cham-
ber’s abolition, finding that the Star Chamber’s downfall was 
not an objection to “the presence of counsel per se but rather to 
the obligation to be represented by counsel effectively in service 
to the crown.”
118
 Thus, the dissent finds that the majority reads 
too far into the role of self-representation in the Chamber’s 
downfall, which, instead, merely represented the pronounce-
ment that the corruptness of lawyers imposed upon defendants 
of the Star Chamber was “a punishing imposition” that put the 
defendants in a worse position than if they were to represent 
themselves.
119
 However, it would be a stretch to equivocate be-
tween the context and procedures used in the Star Chamber 
and the modern practice of court appointed counsel in the Unit-
ed States. The Supreme Court has long recognized that a de-
fendant is generally better off with court appointed counsel.
120
 
Finally, Chief Justice Burger pointedly questions the ma-
jority’s reliance on the significance of free choice in justifying a 
defendant’s right of self-representation.
121
 Believing that the 
prosecuting attorney and trial judge are “charged with . . . in-
suring that justice, in the broadest sense of that term, is 
achieved in every criminal trial,” the Chief Justice argues that 
not only are the defendant’s interests at stake, but also that the 
“integrity of and public confidence in the [judicial] system are 
undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due to the de-
fendant’s ill-advised decision to waive counsel.”
122
 Thus, the 
Sixth Amendment should be read as ensuring that every crimi-
nal defendant be afforded the “fullest possible defense” and the 
determination as to whether the defendant can proceed pro se 
 
comfortable with obligatory representation by lawyers who many felt were 
loyal to the crown. See id. at 931. 
 118. See Cerruti, supra note 59, at 930–31. This sentiment is supported by 
Justice Blackmun’s observation that remedies exist to alleviate a defendant 
from overbearing counsel, and that Faretta had no “distrust, animosity, or 
other personal differences” with his counsel that would have made effective 
counsel unlikely. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 119. Cerruti, supra note 59, at 931. 
 120. See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (“It is undeniable that in most crim-
inal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than 
by their own unskilled efforts.”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) 
(discussing the disadvantages of self-representation, and envisioning a scenar-
io in which the defendant, “though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of con-
viction because he does not know how to establish his innocence”). 
 121. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 839–40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 839. 
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should be left to the discretion of the trial judge.
123
 For, “[t]rue 
freedom of choice and society’s interest in seeing that justice is 
achieved can be vindicated only if the trial court retains discre-
tion to reject any attempted waiver of counsel . . . .”
124
  
In light of the foregoing discussion, some commentators 
advocate that Faretta ought to be overruled entirely and the 
Sixth Amendment should no longer be read as implying a right 
of self-representation.
125
 However, this Note argues that this is 
unnecessary. Although the previous discussion highlighted the 
weaknesses in Faretta’s majority opinion, there is reason to be-
lieve that the six justices comprising the majority were not so 
misguided.
126
 In fact, the majority acknowledged that the “help 
of a lawyer is essential to assure” a fair trial and that “a strong 
argument [could] surely be made that the whole thrust of [prior 
precedent] most inevitably lead to the conclusion that a State 
may constitutionally impose a lawyer upon even an unwilling 
defendant.”
127
 However, the majority balked over the concern of 
a defendant’s free choice, and used autonomy principles to jus-
tify curtailing the “interest of the State in seeing that justice is 
done in a real and objective sense.”
128
 Justice Blackmun argued 
that “[t]he procedural problems spawned by an absolute right 
to self-representation will far outweigh whatever tactical ad-
vantage the defendant may feel he has gained by electing to 
represent himself.”
129
 While the procedural concerns that wor-
ried Justice Blackmun at the time he penned his dissent proved 
to be valid issues that the Court would go on to address in sub-
sequent cases,
130
 the next Section focuses on the procedural, 
ethical, and justness concerns implicated when courts allow a 
 
 123. Id. at 840. 
 124. Id.  
 125. See, e.g., John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right To Shoot One-
self in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty 
Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 598 (1996) (calling the 
Faretta decision a “foolish Sixth Amendment doctrine” and finding that the 
“right to self-representation does not have a sound constitutional basis and 
raises serious policy concerns”). 
 126. See Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, N.C. L. 
REV. 621, 638 (2005) (acknowledging that, despite the fact that Faretta resort-
ed to such “flimsy” free choice rhetoric when it justified the right of self-
representation, the importance of a criminal defendant’s freedom nevertheless 
plays an “essential part [in] our modern criminal justice system”). 
 127. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832–33. 
 128. Id. at 851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 852. 
 130. Id. (raising the possible procedural concerns, and lack of guidance sur-
rounding the effective waiver of counsel, the use and parameters of standby 
counsel, the timeliness of waiving counsel, etc.).  
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defendant facing the death penalty to proceed pro se at trial. 
B. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF SELF-
REPRESENTATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
 [T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from 
life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only 
a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corre-
sponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that 
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”
131
 
Whether or not society unanimously agrees with the notion 
that the death penalty is qualitatively different from a sentence 
of imprisonment, the sentiment has been a recurring theme in 
death penalty cases,
132
 and it provided the motive force behind 
the Supreme Court’s command in Furman that the death pen-
alty must be administered free of arbitrariness and capricious-
ness, or else it would be a violation of the defendant’s Eight 
Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment.
133
 
Nevertheless, the Court subsequently held in Gregg that so 
long as the procedural safeguards in place during capital pro-
ceedings ensure that the jury’s decision to impose, or not to im-
pose, the death penalty is implemented in a way that sufficient-
ly reduces juror discretion, the death penalty is 
constitutional.
134
  
However, it is interesting to note that Faretta, which con-
stitutionalized the right of self-representation in criminal pros-
ecutions, was decided in 1975—three years after the Court had 
found the death penalty’s administration to be unconstitution-
al, and one year before the Court would decide Gregg and effec-
tively lift the moratorium on the death penalty. Coincidence? 
Perhaps. But it is at least plausible to believe that when the 
Supreme Court considered the right of self-representation in 
Faretta, the Court failed to consider the implications that such 
a broad right would have in capital proceedings. This Section 
examines the nature of those implications. Subsection 1 dis-
cusses the untenable proposition of permitting a defendant to 
proceed pro se in a capital proceeding while simultaneously 
 
 131. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 132. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 877 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (referring to the notion that death is different as a recurring “motto”). 
 133. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313–4 (1972) (White, J., concur-
ring) (per curiam). 
 134. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (finding that the 
jury’s discretion had been sufficiently channeled). 
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hoping to protect the safeguards that the Court has sought to 
ensure when a defendant’s life is at stake.
135
 Subsection 2 exam-
ines the damaging effects that self-representation has with re-
gards to the State’s and society’s interests in the fair admin-
istration of judicial proceedings, which are amplified in the 
context of capital proceedings.  
1. Over the Centerline: Tensions Between Free Choice and 
Safeguards in Capital Proceedings 
When the majority in Faretta declared that the Sixth 
Amendment right to assistance of counsel implied the right of 
self-representation, it was cognizant of the fact that a pro se de-
fendant would relinquish “many of the traditional benefits as-
sociated with the right to counsel.”
136
 Without the aid of coun-
sel, the pro se defendant must wade through intricate trial 
procedures, successfully raise time-sensitive issues, and deci-
pher the judge and prosecuting attorney’s legal jargon, all the 
while trying to present their best defense through the submis-
sion of admissible evidence. Ultimately, the lay defendant runs 
the risk of being “put on trial without a proper charge, and con-
victed upon incompetent evidence” because without “the guid-
ing hand of counsel” at each stage of the criminal proceeding, 
“though he [may] be not guilty, he faces the danger of convic-
tion because he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence.”
137
  
Therefore, given the serious disadvantages that a pro se 
defendant inflicts upon himself when he chooses to litigate his 
own case,
138
 the severity of his potential sentence ought to be a 
relevant consideration when assessing the soundness of the 
right of self-representation. And there is no sentence that car-
ries a more severe punishment than the imposition of death.
139
 
Because of the severity and uniqueness of the death penalty, 
the Supreme Court has heightened the procedural safeguards 
 
 135. See id. at 187 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)). 
 136. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
 137. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); see also Pearson, supra 
note 75, at 708 (“A typical untrained defendant is no more likely to know her 
way through the trial ritual than the average layperson is to comprehend the 
intricacies of how a priest performs a religious ritual.”). 
 138. It is worth noting that there may be exceptional circumstances in 
which a defendant is especially intelligent or legally-versed. However, this is 
truly the exception and not the rule. And even a lay defendant that is familiar 
with legal concepts will not have the same proficiency as a regularly practicing 
defense attorney. 
 139. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The unusual 
severity of death is manifested most clearly in its finality and enormity.”). 
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in capital proceedings to minimize the potential for the “hap-
hazard, arbitrary, and capricious” imposition of the death pen-
alty.
140
 Accordingly, the Court recognizes death penalty statutes 
that incorporate a bifurcated trial—consisting of two separate 
phases: (1) the guilt determination phase; and (2) the sentenc-
ing phase, where the jurors consider aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors in order to guide their decision—as a valid way of 
imposing the death penalty.
141
 Essentially, “[i]n order to ensure 
‘reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate 
punishment in a specific case’ the jury must be able to consider 
and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defend-
ant’s background and character or the circumstances of the 
crime.”
142
 
However, the Court’s reliance upon the sentencing phase to 
quell its concern over juror discretion—and fear of arbitrarily 
imposing the death penalty—is undermined by two observa-
tions. First, there is no mandatory requirement that mitigating 
evidence be introduced during the sentencing phase of a capital 
proceeding.
143
 Second, even for the states that do require the 
presentation of mitigating evidence during the sentencing 
phase,
144
 there is good reason to believe that the professed arbi-
trariness-correcting effects that trial bifurcation has in the con-
text of capital proceedings are overstated.
145
  
In William Bowers’ study of juror decision making in bifur-
 
 140. FOLEY, supra note 83, at 89. 
 141. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976). 
 142. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)). 
 143. See Toone, supra note 126, at 630 (“Lower state and federal courts 
have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether defendants should be al-
lowed to waive [the presentation of mitigating evidence] . . . . The majority of 
courts, however, have concluded that the Constitution permits defendants to 
waive [the presentation of mitigating evidence].”). 
 144. See, e.g., Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178, 189–90 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam) 
(holding that when a defendant waives the right to present mitigation evi-
dence, the trial court is required to order the preparation of a pre-sentencing 
investigation (PSI) and “in its discretion, may call witnesses to present mitiga-
tion evidence to the extent that the PSI alerts the court to the existence of sig-
nificant mitigation”); State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 951 (N.J. 1988) (find-
ing that the constitutional necessity to ensure that the death penalty is not 
“wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed” requires that the defendant present 
mitigating evidence to the jury (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., 
concurring))). 
 145. See generally William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Cap-
ital Sentencing: Jurors’ Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature 
Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476 (1998) (finding that a great num-
ber of jurors serving in capital cases admit to “early punishment decision mak-
ing” and examining the potential explanations for this occurrence). 
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cated capital trials, he surveyed 916 capital jurors in eleven 
states, and his findings suggested that “many jurors reached a 
personal decision concerning punishment before the sentencing 
stage of the trial”
146
 and revealed that “jurors who take an early 
stand on punishment [tend] to stick with it” and “are largely 
unreceptive to both evidence and arguments presented later in 
the trial.”
147
 Thus, because “virtually half of the capital jurors” 
reach a decision about a defendant’s punishment on the basis of 
what they learn during the guilt determination phase of a capi-
tal proceeding,
148
 well before mitigating factors are presented to 
the jury during the sentencing phase, the significance of the de-
fendant’s quality of advocacy during the guilt determination 
phase is intensified. Therefore, the inherent tension between a 
defendant’s free choice and the procedural safeguards during 
capital proceedings is apparent. Because each time a defendant 
elects to proceed pro se—manifesting his right to freely choose 
the manner with which to personally present his defense—he 
not only disadvantages himself against the prosecution, but he 
undermines the effectiveness of state death penalty statutes in 
avoiding the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
penalty.
149
  
2. Compromising Fairness, Legitimacy and the Adversarial 
Nature of a Criminal Trial in Favor of Free Choice 
The Supreme Court believes that criminal trials under the 
Constitution serve the “clearly defined purpose[] to provide a 
fair and reliable determination of guilt, and no procedure or oc-
currence which seriously threatens to divert it from that pur-
pose can be tolerated.”
150
 One critical way in which the United 
States’ criminal justice system aims to effectuate this goal is 
through its adversarial process.
151
  
 
 146. Id. at 1477. 
 147. Id. at 1493. 
 148. See id. at 1488 (finding that “(48.3%) [of jurors] in the eleven . . . 
states indicated that they thought they knew what the punishment should be 
during the guilt phase of the trial”). 
 149. See id. at 1489 (“This blatant departure from the Court’s expectations 
concerning the timing of jurors’ sentencing decisions suggests that post-
Furman capital statutes are not operating as the Court supposed.”). This fur-
thers the argument that counsel should be required in capital proceedings, re-
gardless of whether the presentation of mitigating evidence is required or not. 
For a discussion of the effects of requiring mitigating evidence, see infra Part 
II.C.2. 
 150. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 564 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).  
 151. See Toone, supra note 126, at 641 (explaining that the American crim-
inal justice system depends on the “parties’ aggressive pursuit of their own 
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The fact that the criminal justice system utilizes an adver-
sarial system should not be taken for granted. It reflects socie-
tal values regarding personal dignity, security, and legitima-
cy.
152
 For instance, Professor Fuller hypothesized that a judge 
acting “without the aid of partisan advocacy” has a tendency to 
reach premature conclusions or pursue certain theories satisfy-
ing their “understandable desire” to bring coherence and order 
to the trial.
153
 However, Fuller notes that “what starts as a pre-
liminary diagnosis designed to direct the inquiry tends . . . to 
become a fixed conclusion.”
154
 This preliminary diagnosis subtly 
ensures that all evidence confirming the judge’s theory makes a 
“strong imprint” on his mind “while all [evidence] that runs 
counter to it is received with diverted attention.”
155
  
Fortunately, this sort of judicial evidentiary-funneling is 
minimized in an adversarial system. By inserting dueling advo-
cates, the prosecution and defense strive to ensure that all ma-
terial facts are vetted. In a study comparing adversarial and 
inquisitorial fact-finding, it was found that both regimes tend 
to “cease their fact search as soon as they became confident of 
their assessment of the legal conflict.”
156
 Essentially, when the 
distribution of facts affirms their “preliminary diagnosis,” fact-
finders take their foot off the gas and begin coasting toward the 
finish line—confident that the facts support their position. 
However, the study’s most revealing finding was that in adver-
sarial contexts, once an attorney learns that his client’s posi-
tion is “least supported by the initial distribution of evidence” 
those attorneys tended to conduct their fact-finding investiga-
tions more diligently than in non-adversarial contexts.
157
 This 
not only effectuates the United States’ requirement that a crim-
inal defendant be found guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt,”
158
 
but it increases the public’s confidence in the judicial system as 
a whole. When the public trusts that the adversarial system is 
tirelessly working to ensure that all pertinent facts are consid-
 
interests”). 
 152. See Freedman, supra note 17, at 73–74. 
 153. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report 
of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958). 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
 156. E. Allen Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adver-
sary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1141 (1973). 
 157. See id. at 1142–43. 
 158. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the 
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged.”). 
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ered, the process is legitimized because the public can see jus-
tice through the protection of the innocent from erroneous con-
victions, while holding guilty persons accountable. 
Accordingly, Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, which guar-
antees the effective assistance of counsel to all criminal defend-
ants,
159
 is premised upon the idea of “promoting ‘partisan advo-
cacy on both sides of a case’” in furtherance of the adversarial 
system’s goal to ensure “‘that the guilty be convicted and the 
innocent go free.’”
160
 Thus, the right to counsel is a mechanism 
working to ensure the integrity of the criminal justice system, 
which is “a common, societal interest embodied both in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and in the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”
161
 
Conversely, the Sixth Amendment’s embedded right of self-
representation safeguards the autonomy of the accused, which 
is an individual interest intimate to the defendant alone.
162
 
Consequently, the two rights are at a “philosophical tension” in 
which the right of self-representation “often corrupts the crimi-
nal process by replacing trained and experienced counsel with 
an autonomous yet ineffective advocate.”
163
 Because the typical 
pro se defendant lacks the legal skill required to adequately 
protect himself,
164
 he makes the jury’s decision to convict all the 
easier. And when a conviction carries a potential death sen-
tence—a sentence that is unique in its finality
165
—the im-
portance of zealous advocacy is of the utmost priority.
166
 Assis-
 
 159. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 160. See Toone, supra note 126, at 641 (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 
U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). 
 161. Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: 
An Argument for Fairness and Against Self Representation in the Criminal 
Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 169 (2001) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 162. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (“The right to de-
fend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the 
personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must 
be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his ad-
vantage.” (emphasis added)). 
 163. See Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 161, at 169. 
 164. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938). 
 165. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 167 (1990) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (recognizing the “unique” and “irrevocable nature of the death penal-
ty”). 
 166. This need for effective advocacy is amplified in light of the previous 
Section discussing the lack of a constitutional requirement to present mitiga-
tion evidence during sentencing, as well as Professor Bowers’ study, which re-
vealed that nearly fifty percent of jurors reach their determination of whether 
the defendant should receive a sentence of life or death during the guilt-
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tance of counsel not only offers the defendant his best chance to 
present a formidable defense,
167
 but it effectively transforms a 
one-sided affair into a more even playing field, functioning to 
legitimize the public’s confidence in the capital proceeding by 
thwarting an “easy conviction.”
168
 
Moreover, the crux of the tension between the right of self-
representation and capital proceedings begins by effectively 
removing one adversary from the proceeding. Due to the lay de-
fendant’s unfamiliarity with the intricacies of the practice of 
law,
169
 the right of self-representation unjustly compromises the 
quality of the adversarial process,
170
 which ultimately dimin-
ishes the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem as a whole.
171
 With this in mind, Section C proceeds to con-
sider various suggestions that scholars and commentators often 
advance as viable ways to minimize the effect of the aforemen-
tioned concerns. 
C. SCHOLARLY ATTEMPTS HAVE FAILED TO REACH A 
SATISFACTORY SOLUTION 
Having now considered the constitutional infirmity of 
Faretta, as well as the tensions that arise when considering the 
right of self-representation in the context of a capital proceed-
ing, this Section considers two frequently advanced proposals 
to alleviate these concerns. Subsection 1 examines suggestions 
that courts should enhance, and improve, the implementation 
of standby counsel in pro se cases. Subsection 2 considers ar-
guments advancing the notion that the presentation of mitiga-
tion evidence should be required in all capital proceedings, even 
if the defendant desires not to proffer such a defense. 
 
determination phase of a capital proceeding. See Bowers et al., supra note 145, 
at 1493; discussion supra Part II.B.1.  
 167. An effective defense is not merely an impassioned one, which surely a 
pro se defendant could provide—but it requires the legal skill and proficiency 
with trial procedure that can only be guaranteed through assistance of coun-
sel. 
 168. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 839–40 (1975) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (expressing concern that a defendant’s waiver of counsel might re-
sult in an easy conviction that would undermine the integrity of the judicial 
proceeding). 
 169. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462–63. 
 170. See Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 161, at 169 (explaining that self-
representation effectively removes one adversary from the adversarial pro-
cess). 
 171. Cf. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Nor is it accu-
rate to suggest . . . that the quality of his representation at trial is a matter 
with which only the accused is legitimately concerned.”). 
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1. Increasing or Mandating the Role of Standby Counsel 
When a defendant exercises his right of self-
representation, the Supreme Court holds that a pro se “defend-
ant does not have a constitutional right to receive personal in-
struction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure. Nor does 
the Constitution require judges to take over chores for a pro se 
defendant” that would normally be handled by appointed coun-
sel.
172
 These considerations often motivate judges to appoint 
standby counsel to a pro se defendant, whereby the standby 
counsel guides the defendant through the basic procedural and 
courtroom protocols
173
 and remains prepared in case the de-
fendant’s self-representation is revoked.
174
 
However, the Supreme Court has not granted a constitu-
tional right to the appointment of standby counsel, nor has it 
prescribed a minimum right of assistance to be performed by 
standby counsel once one is appointed.
175
 Nevertheless, the in-
creased role of standby counsel has been a frequent rallying cry 
by commentators wishing to retain the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right of self-representation, while alleviating the 
fairness and efficiency concerns it entails.
176
 Professor Poulin, 
one of the leading advocates for increasing the role of standby 
counsel, believes that “[t]he courts should permit, and standby 
counsel should provide, the maximum assistance consistent 
with the limits imposed by McKaskle.”
177
 Therein lies the prob-
lem—the guidance that the Court has provided regarding the 
scope of standby counsel is largely undefined.
178
 When a court 
exercises its discretion to appoint standby counsel, the benefits 
 
 172. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183–84 (1984). 
 173. Id. at 183. 
 174. See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in Criminal 
Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the Criminal Justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
676, 704 (2000) (stating that some courts expect standby counsel to be “pre-
pared to assume representation of the defendant” if he or she abandons pro se 
representation). 
 175. See Decker, supra note 125, at 532–33 (citing Molino v. Dubois, 848 F. 
Supp. 11, 13–14 (D. Mass. 1994)). 
 176. See Poulin, supra note 174, at 681 (“Faretta created tension between 
the defendant’s right to proceed pro se and society’s interest in maintaining 
the fairness of the criminal justice system.”); see also Pearson, supra note 75, 
at 713 (advocating for mandatory standby counsel in California criminal pro-
ceedings and arguing that standby counsel can “serve to significantly lessen 
the negative effects of a pro se defense, without hampering its exercise”). 
 177. Poulin, supra note 174, at 720. 
 178. See Pearson, supra note 75, at 715 (“[T]he exact nature of the pro-
posed standby counsel is a complex question.”); Poulin, supra note 174, at 676 
(referring to standby counsel as occupying a “twilight zone of the law” in which 
“an attorney may be unsure of her duties and the extent of her obligation”). 
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are readily apparent; standby counsel is an effective way to en-
sure a pro se defendant follows regular courtroom protocol and 
minimizes “the inefficiency and disruptions of a layperson pre-
senting her own case.”
179
 However, at the same time, standby 
counsel enters a “treacherous zone of representation” where he 
must avoid “undermin[ing] either the defendant’s actual control 
of the defense or the appearance that the defendant controls 
the defense.”
180
 What would it look like to undermine the con-
trol of pro se defendant’s defense? Would it undermine a pro se 
defendant’s control if a judge appointed standby counsel 
against the pro se defendant’s objection? The Supreme Court 
believes not.
181
 Similarly, what would constitute undermining a 
pro se defendant’s appearance of control? Would permitting 
standby counsel to conduct the pro se defendant’s closing ar-
gument diminish his appearance of control?’
182
 What if standby 
counsel cross-examined witnesses?
183
 What if a judge literally 
introduced standby counsel to the jury as “the attorney for the 
defendant”?
184
 In each instance, courts have ruled in the nega-
tive—proving that it is exceedingly difficult to “destroy [a] ju-
ry’s perception that the defendant is representing himself.”
185
  
Nevertheless, even if the scope of standby counsel was 
more carefully prescribed, it seems like an utter contradiction 
to assert that the Sixth Amendment is entrenched in notions of 
personal autonomy, while simultaneously permitting standby 
counsel to have such far-reaching influence on the pro se de-
fendant’s defense. Further, it is hard to believe that the Faretta 
Court, after expressly discussing the importance that a defend-
ant’s waiver of counsel be done “knowingly” once made “aware 
 
 179. Poulin, supra note 174, at 702. 
 180. Poulin, supra note 74, at 212–13. 
 181. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984) (“A defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights are not violated when a trial judge appoints standby coun-
sel—even over the defendant’s objection . . . .”). 
 182. See id. at 182–83 (finding that standby counsel’s closing argument did 
not infringe upon Defendant’s right of self-representation because Defendant 
permitted standby counsel to do so). 
 183. See United States v. Heine, 920 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1990) (reject-
ing Defendant’s assertion that standby counsel interfered with his right of 
self-representation and, instead, holding that Defendant “impliedly waived his 
right to proceed pro se by acquiescing to [standby counsel’s] increasingly active 
role at trial”). 
 184. Ramos v. Racette, 726 F.3d 284, 289 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that the 
“mischaracterization did not cross McKaskle’s substantial interruption thresh-
old for a constitutional violation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 185. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178. 
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of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,”
186
 
would have anticipated such intrusive action on behalf of court 
appointed standby counsel.  
2. Requiring the Presentation of Mitigating Evidence During 
the Sentencing Phase of Capital Proceedings 
Although the previous Section discussed the appointment 
of standby counsel when a defendant elects to proceed pro se, 
which applies generally to all criminal prosecutions, this Sec-
tion deals exclusively in the context of a pro se defendant in a 
capital proceeding. Many scholars have suggested that the 
presentation of mitigating evidence must be required—even 
over a pro se defendant’s objection—during the sentencing 
phase of a capital proceeding in order to comply with the 
heightened procedural safeguards of death penalty jurispru-
dence.
187
 Because most courts allow pro se defendants to waive 
the presentation of mitigating evidence during sentencing, the-
se scholars believe that the effect is irreconcilable with the con-
stitutional requirement that the death penalty not be arbitrari-
ly imposed.
188
 A jury that “hears only the prosecutor’s . . . 
presentation of the aggravating circumstances that support ex-
ecution will lack the ability to assess ‘the uniqueness of the in-
dividual’” which exacerbates, instead of alleviates, the concern 
of juror discretion.
189
  
However, most courts grant pro se defendants the discre-
tion to forgo presenting mitigation evidence during the sentenc-
ing phase because “[t]he core of a defendant’s right to pro se 
representation is his ability to preserve actual control over the 
case he chooses to present to the jury.”
190
 Thus, requiring a pro 
se defendant to present mitigating evidence against his will 
would effectively usurp the defendant’s ability to control what 
 
 186. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
 187. See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Ar-
gument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right To Volunteer for Execution at Cer-
tain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 96 (2002) 
(“[S]ociety’s interest in non-arbitrary and consistent application [of the death 
penalty] requires assurances of guilt and the appropriateness of the death sen-
tence. These assurances are undermined when a defendant [waives the 
presentation of mitigation evidence].”). 
 188. See Rieder, supra note 105, at 152 (arguing that “courts should re-
quire that mitigating evidence be presented on the defendant’s behalf over and 
above his objections”).  
 189. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)). 
 190. United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378, 385 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178). 
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he presents to the jury—violating his Sixth Amendment right 
of self-representation.
191
  
Moreover, not only does requiring the presentation of miti-
gating evidence encroach upon the free-choice ideal that the 
right of self-representation seeks to embolden, but there is good 
reason to believe that any fairness or procedural-correcting ef-
fects its presentation might have in the context of a capital pro-
ceeding are overstated.
192
 Recall, in William Bowers’ study of 
juror decision making in bifurcated capital trials,
193
 the results 
indicated that most jurors admit to having been “absolutely 
convinced” of their early stance on the defendant’s punishment 
and adhered to their respective stance throughout the trial.
194
 
In fact, there is evidence that a juror’s “[p]re-existing feelings 
that “death is the only acceptable punishment for many kinds 
of aggravated murder” and the belief that “premeditated mur-
der requires the death penalty substantially contribute[s] to an 
early pro-death stand.”
195
 On the other hand, evidence also sug-
gests that “[e]arly pro-life stands are largely independent of 
death penalty values . . . but they are strongly influenced by 
lingering doubt about the defendant’s guilt.”
196
 Therefore, as 
Bowers astutely points out, the guilt-determination phase of 
trial “has become a venue for advocating punishment stands 
and for injecting punishment considerations into the guilt deci-
sion.”
197
 Accordingly—in the context of a capital proceeding—
not only would requiring a pro se defendant to present mitigat-
ing evidence fail to sufficiently respect the defendant’s autono-
my to choose the manner in which he presents his defense to 
the jury, but evidence suggests that the coerced presentation of 
mitigating evidence would fail to meaningfully lessen the dis-
cretionary and arbitrariness concerns that bifurcated trials 
seek to eliminate in the first place.
198
 
To reiterate, as the forgoing discussion indicates, due to 
 
 191. Id. (holding that standby counsel’s attempt to present mitigating evi-
dence against the wishes of the pro se defendant would violate the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right of self-representation). 
 192. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 193. Id.   
 194. See Bowers et al., supra note 145, at 1546. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id.  
 198. See Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on 
Death: Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is 
No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1041 (2001) (finding a pattern that “miti-
gating factors play a disturbingly minor role in jurors’ deliberations about 
whether a defendant should be sentenced to death”). 
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the inherent tension between self-representation and the safe-
guards necessary to ensure that capital proceedings avoid arbi-
trary and capricious impositions of the death penalty,
199
 some 
commentators suggest that standby counsel offers an effective 
way for pro se defendants to assert their autonomous right to 
present their own defense, while still allowing a defendant to 
navigate his way through complex capital proceedings.
200
 How-
ever, not only has standby counsel been inconsistently ap-
plied,
201
 but due to its imprecise scope, standby counsel fre-
quently encroaches upon a pro se defendant’s autonomous 
representation—the very notion that commentators attempt to 
sustain. 
Additionally, other commentators suggest that requiring 
the presentation of mitigation evidence during the sentencing 
phase of capital proceedings affords an alternative way to con-
serve self-representation, while effectuating the safeguards 
demanded in capital proceedings.
202
 Nevertheless, aside from 
the untenable suggestion that a pro se defendant’s autonomy is 
maintained despite requiring that they present mitigating evi-
dence during the sentencing phase, Professor Bower’s’ study—
indicating that most jurors determine their stance on sentenc-
ing during the guilt-determination stage
203
—undermines the 
perceived effectiveness of such a proposal. Thus, Part III pro-
poses a novel approach that squarely addresses the tension be-
tween self-representation and the safeguards required in capi-
tal proceedings. 
III.  QUALIFYING THE RIGHT OF SELF-
REPRESENTATION TO ACCOMMODATE FOR 
CAPITAL PROCEEDINGS   
Nearly four decades ago, Faretta v. California held that the 
Sixth Amendment implied the right of self-representation.
204
 As 
a 6–3 decision, the majority and dissenting opinions were utter-
ly divided. Although the majority grounded its holding in a tex-
tual interpretation, which it supported through a historical in-
quiry, the true lynchpin of the right of self-representation has 
proved to be the respect for a defendant’s autonomy when con-
 
 199. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 201. Cf. supra note 178 and accompanying text (explaining the complex 
and undefined role of standby counsel). 
 202. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 203. See supra notes 194–94 and accompanying text. 
 204. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975). 
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ducting his criminal defense.
205
 In Martinez v. Court of Appeal 
of California, Fourth Appellate District, a case illustrating the 
continuing polarization of Faretta, Justice Breyer candidly 
acknowledged that judges sometimes express “dismay about 
the practical consequences of that holding.”
206
 In fact, Justice 
Breyer expressed a willingness to “reconsider the constitutional 
assumptions that underlie” Faretta if it could be shown that the 
right of self-representation has proved “counterproductive in 
practice.”
207
  
Given the tensions existing between the right of self-
representation and the fair and non-arbitrary administration of 
the death penalty,
208
 self-representation in capital proceedings 
is counterproductive. A solution to this problem cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved through mere peripheral modifications, such 
as expanding and defining the use of standby counsel,
209
 or by 
requiring the presentation of mitigating evidence during the 
sentencing phase.
210
 Instead, the right of self-representation 
should be categorically denied to capital defendants. Section A 
proposes that the right of self-representation be eliminated in 
capital proceedings, and discusses how to effectuate such an 
elimination. Section B suggests that the courts can use the 
right to effective assistance of counsel to serve as a check on 
court-appointed counsel, ensuring that a defendant’s autonomy 
 
 205. This is supported by the Supreme Court’s admission that “the original 
reasons for protecting [the right of self-representation] do not have the same 
force when the availability of competent counsel for every indigent defendant 
has displaced the need—although not always the desire—for self-
representation.” Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 
528 U.S. 152, 158 (2000). Thus, whatever historical need there may have been 
for the right of self-representation when the nation was founded—presumably 
stemming from the colonists’ distrust of lawyers—has been tempered by in-
creased availability of competent counsel. However, the Court notes that just 
because the need is no longer as apparent, it does not change a potential de-
fendant’s “desire” for self-representation. Id.; see also Erica J. Hashimoto, 
Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right To Control the Case, 
90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1155 (2010) (explaining that the concept of autonomy 
provided the background for the Court’s “recognition of the right of self-
representation” and that “the Court has since made clear that ‘[t]he right to 
appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused’” (quot-
ing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984))). 
 206. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 164 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing United 
States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J., concur-
ring) (“The right to self-representation . . . frequently, though not always, con-
flicts squarely and inherently with the right to a fair trial.”)). 
 207. See id. at 164–65. 
 208. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 209. See discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
 210. See discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
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is respected through his ability to influence his defense.  
A. REMOVING THE RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION FOR 
CAPITAL DEFENDANTS 
As the number of defendants electing to proceed pro se con-
tinues to rise,
211
 courts and scholars alike have continued to 
grapple with the right of self-representation. And, as defend-
ants exercise their right of self-representation in capital pro-
ceedings, courts are becoming increasingly uncomfortable with 
the inherent tension of respecting a defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment right of self-representation while attempting to simulta-
neously administer the death penalty in a way that does not vi-
olate that defendant’s Eight Amendment rights—i.e., guarding 
against arbitrary and discretionary sentencing.
212
 Justice Chin 
of the California Supreme Court—the State that spawned 
Faretta—suggests that “[t]here is much to be said for modifying 
Faretta, at least in capital cases;” however, he follows Faretta 
and its progeny “under compulsion” because it is the law of the 
land.
213
 This does not need to be the case. 
Article III of the Constitution vests the “judicial Power of 
the United States . . . in one supreme Court.”
214
 Further, it is 
the “province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is,”
215
 and that pronouncement “shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.”
216
 Thus, if the Supreme Court were to grant 
certiorari over a case involving a pro se defendant in a capital 
proceeding, it would be entirely within the Court’s authority to 
determine, as a matter of first impression,
217
 whether allowing 
a defendant to proceed pro se in a capital proceeding inherently 
violates the defendant’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 211. See Marie Higgins Williams, Comment, The Pro Se Criminal Defend-
ant, Standby Counsel, and the Judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined Roles, 71 
U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 815 (2000) (noting that “it is clear that ‘increasing num-
bers of Americans are going solo in every venue’” (quoting Laura Parker & 
Gary Fields, Do-It-Yourself Law Hits Courts, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 1999, at 
3A)). 
 212. See Rieder, supra note 105, at 134 (“[L]ower federal and state courts 
have begun to confront the conflict between the right of self-representation 
proclaimed in Faretta and the state’s duty to prevent the arbitrary imposition 
of the death penalty.”). 
 213. See People v. Dent, 65 P.3d 1286, 1291, 1293 (Cal. 2003) (Chin, J., 
concurring). 
 214. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 215. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 216. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 217. See Rieder, supra note 105, at 134 (finding that “the Supreme Court 
has never addressed the issue” of self-representation in a capital proceeding).  
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rights to a fair and non-arbitrary death penalty proceeding.  
Accordingly, much like the Court’s previous decisions limit-
ing the right of self-representation, such as when a defendant 
acts in a way that defies the dignity of the courtroom,
218
 or 
when a defendant lacks the requisite mental competency to 
conduct his own defense at trial,
219
 or its holding that there is 
no right of self-representation on appeal from a criminal convic-
tion
220
—the Court can, and should, similarly deny the right of 
self-representation during capital proceedings.  
The assistance of counsel empowers defendants to present 
a formidable defense at trial,
221
 it levels the playing field with 
the prosecution, and it serves to legitimize the public’s confi-
dence in the capital proceeding by thwarting an “easy convic-
tion.”
222
 Thus, requiring counsel in capital proceedings not only 
furthers the adversarial nature of the trial, but it enables the 
defendant to put forth his best defense before the jury at a time 
when it has been statistically determined that jurors tend to 
entrench themselves in their decision regarding a sentence of 
life or death.
223
 Although detractors might suggest that court 
appointed counsel is largely ineffective,
224
 the fact remains that 
these are licensed, experienced trial attorneys that are far more 
 
 218. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (declaring that 
the “right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the 
courtroom” and doing so warrants the termination of “self-representation by a 
defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist miscon-
duct”). 
 219. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution 
permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent 
enough to stand trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the 
point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by them-
selves.”). 
 220. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 
U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (finding that the “autonomy interests that survive a felo-
ny conviction are less compelling than those motivating the decision in 
Faretta” and, therefore, “[s]tates are clearly within their discretion to conclude 
that the government’s interests outweigh the invasion of the appellant’s inter-
est in self-representation” (emphasis added)). 
 221. See supra note 175. 
 222. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 839–40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (expressing 
concern that a defendant’s waiver of counsel might result in an easy conviction 
that would undermine the integrity of the judicial proceeding). 
 223. See Bowers et al., supra note 145, at 1488 (“Virtually half of the capi-
tal jurors (48.3%) in the eleven . . . states indicated that they thought they 
knew what the punishment should be during the guilt phase of the trial.”). 
 224. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An 
Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 467 
(2007) (suggesting that “the quality of court-appointed counsel is breathtak-
ingly low in many jurisdictions”). 
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prepared to navigate the procedural landscape of a capital pro-
ceeding than a lay defendant.
225
  
Thus, when the opportunity presents itself (i.e., a pro se 
defendant litigating a capital case), the Supreme Court should 
grant certiorari to finally address the tension between the right 
of self-representation and the procedural safeguards required 
in capital proceedings. Then, in light of the foregoing discus-
sion, the Justices should act in accordance with their constitu-
tional authority to qualify the right of the self-representation
226
 
by eliminating it in the context of capital proceedings. 
B. INVIGORATING THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL  
In order for the Supreme Court to most effectively institute 
its modification of the Sixth Amendment right of self-
representation—by denying it in capital proceedings—it should 
strengthen its commitment to assistance of counsel. For, not 
only does the Constitution guarantee the assistance of counsel 
to a criminal defendant,
227
 but the Court must provide effective 
assistance of counsel.
228
 When a court appoints counsel to rep-
resent a defendant in a capital proceeding, the lawyer-client re-
lationship is unquestionably formed.
229
 Thus, the lawyer is ethi-
cally required to zealously advocate on behalf of his client in a 
way that furthers the defendant’s objectives,
230
 and in a fashion 
that respects the defendant’s decisions.
231
 However, as scholars 
 
 225. See Martinez, 528 U.S. at 161 (“Our experience has taught us that ‘a 
pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a de-
fense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney.’” (quoting Decker, 
supra note 125 at 598)). 
 226. Recall that the Supreme Court has already qualified the right of self-
representation in a number of contexts. See discussion supra Part I.A.3. 
 227. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 
(1963) (“[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot 
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”). 
 228. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984) (finding it 
“is not enough” that a lawyer be “present at trial alongside the accused” but, 
instead, “‘the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel’” 
(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))). 
 229. Although the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are silent 
with regards to the formation of the lawyer-client relationship, the Restate-
ment provides that, “A relationship of client and lawyer arises when  
. . . (2) a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the ser-
vices.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000). 
 230. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2013) (“[A] lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .”). 
 231. See id. (“A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a 
matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury 
trial and whether the client will testify.”). 
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often point out, counsel can find themselves in situations where 
a client’s desires are inconsistent with what the lawyer believes 
is in the client’s best interest.
232
 This scenario—while challeng-
ing to counsel—provides courts with a meaningful opportunity 
to ensure that a defendant’s autonomy is respected by appoint-
ed counsel through the doctrine of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.   
In order for a defendant to prove that counsel was ineffec-
tive, he must show: (1) that the defense counsel’s performance 
was deficient; and (2) that the defense counsel’s “deficient per-
formance prejudiced the defense.”
233
 In order for a defendant to 
establish counsel’s deficiency, the errors must be “so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
234
 This requires a 
showing that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”
235
 Further, to establish prejudice, 
the defendant must show that the errors “were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial” with a reliable result.
236
 
Some scholars believe that this standard is too difficult for a de-
fendant to satisfy
237
 because, as the Strickland Court an-
nounced, “[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the 
errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the pro-
ceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet 
that test.”
238
 Moreover, it has been suggested that the Strick-
land standard merely allows reviewing courts to deal “efficient-
ly” with claims of ineffectiveness, “rather than seriously ad-
dress the potential injustice problems caused by incompetent 
trial counsel.”
239
  
However, others believe that various exonerations of inno-
 
 232. See, e.g., Richard C. Dieter, Note, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose 
Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799, 807 (1990) (discussing a 
scenario in which a defendant wants to waive offering mitigating evidence 
while counsel believes that doing so would be against the client’s interests). 
 233. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 688 (“In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the per-
formance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable con-
sidering all the circumstances.”). 
 236. Id. at 687. 
 237. See Hashimoto, supra note 224, at 467 (“The Court . . . has set the 
standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel very high.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 238. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added). 
 239. Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective As-
sistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 
67 (1986). 
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cent individuals have resulted in courts beginning to do more to 
protect the rights of the accused by ensuring the effective assis-
tance of counsel.
240
 The Supreme Court should continue this 
trend and use the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel 
as a mechanism to ensure a capital defendant’s autonomy in-
terests are still respected, despite the fact that self-
representation was denied.  
This can be evidenced by a showing that a defendant suc-
cessfully influenced the way in which counsel presented his de-
fense to the jury. Furthermore, not only can the courts use the 
doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel as a sword to defend 
a capital defendant’s autonomy, but courts can also take 
measures to shield it as well. For example, lower courts can 
better see that a capital defendant receives effective assistance 
by employing judicial monitoring initiatives, whereby court-
appointed counsel would be monitored throughout the capital 
proceeding in order to reduce the potential of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel—or at least identify the issue, and rectify the 
situation.
241
  
Indeed, Professor Richard Klein noted that trial courts are 
well equipped to monitor a defense counsel’s competence at tri-
al,
242
 and further argues that trial courts have a “special bur-
den” when presiding over court-appointed counsel.
243
 In such a 
case, the court must “notify the attorney about the appointment 
early enough in the process so that [counsel] has adequate time 
to prepare the defense. The court must also ensure that the 
counsel appointed is qualified” to handle cases raising “complex 
and serious allegations against the defendant.”
244
 To facilitate 
these objectives, Professor Klein cleverly proposed that crimi-
nal cases adopt a pretrial conference similar to a Rule 16 con-
ference in civil litigation.
245
 During the conference, or “monitor-
 
 240. See Adele Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2003, at 37, 37. 
 241. See Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: 
The Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. 
REV. 531, 532 (1988) (suggesting that courts adopt “judicial monitoring” pro-
cedures where courts examine an attorney’s degree of preparation leading up 
to the trial). 
 242. Id. at 566 (“The trial judge has immense advantages over the appel-
late courts in observing the quality of representation; [the judge] may become 
aware of inadequate lawyering that would not be obvious by the mere review 
of the record.”). 
 243. Id. at 570. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 580. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring attorneys to ap-
pear for a pretrial conference designed to schedule and effectively manage a 
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ing session,” the judge would meet with defense counsel to dis-
cuss discovery requests, what legal issues have been re-
searched, potential witnesses, and “how frequently he has met 
with the client.”
246
 Within the parameters of this Note, Profes-
sor Klein’s proposed monitoring session provides an opportuni-
ty for a judge to conduct a formal inquiry into the defendant’s 
objectives and inclinations. By incorporating Professor Klein’s 
hands-on approach, a trial judge can effectively ensure that a 
defendant’s autonomy interests are not entirely jeopardized in 
capital proceedings.   
Moreover, despite the potential contentions that assistance 
of counsel is generally ineffective, when considering the alter-
natives—either self-representation, or self-representation with 
court-appointed standby counsel—it is hard to believe that a 
defendant’s defense would be any less effective with appointed 
counsel. Indeed, just the opposite, it is much more likely that a 
defendant’s defense, with assistance of counsel, will be superior 
to a defense he presented himself. 
  CONCLUSION   
When Faretta v. California held that the Sixth Amendment 
implied the right of self-representation, the Court empowered 
criminal defendants to waive their rights to assistance of coun-
sel—even against their own self-interest—and enabled defend-
ants to represent themselves as they see fit, “for it is he [the de-
fendant] who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”
247
 
Since Faretta, the right of self-representation has proved to be, 
by and large, a right undergirded by a respect for a criminal de-
fendant’s individual autonomy.
248
 However, this sentiment can 
only go so far before concerns of judicial integrity and the pub-
lic’s waning confidence in the judiciary compromises the legiti-
macy of the American criminal justice system. This effect is es-
pecially pronounced when the right of self-representation 
encroaches upon other constitutional rights.   
This Note argues that when a defendant exercises his 
Sixth Amendment right of self-representation in a capital pro-
ceeding, he does so at the expense of his Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process rights and unduly compromises his Eighth 
Amendment right against the arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty. Therefore, this Note suggests that the right of self-
 
case). 
 246. Klein, supra note 241, at 581.  
 247. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). 
 248. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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representation be categorically denied when a defendant faces 
a capital sentence. Doing so furthers the adversarial nature of 
a capital proceeding and allows for the death penalty—a pun-
ishment that is viewed as “qualitatively different” from all oth-
ers
249
—to be administered in a way that maximizes a defend-
ant’s ability to persuade a jury of not only his innocence, but 
that he is undeserving of death.
250
 
 
 249. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
 250. This is in light of the fact that jurors tend to make their pro-death or 
pro-life decisions during the guilt determination stage of the capital proceed-
ing, and these views tend to remain unchanged following the subsequent sen-
tencing stage. See discussion supra Part II.C.2. 
